

This legislation, H. Con. Res. 2, seeks to repeal Public Law 107-243 in order to ensure that Congress is afforded the opportunity to reexamine the threat posed by Iraq, which would include taking the time to review fully and accurately the findings of the international weapons inspectors prior to the engagement of military forces.

Passage of H. Con. Res. 2 would also provide Congress the time to consider any exit strategy that must be developed prior to deploying troops, as well as the serious domestic impact that possible war with Iraq would involve.

The domestic considerations include the impact on our already struggling economy and the high numbers of troops needed over an indefinite period of time. Such concerns raise the issue of our security at the most basic level when, for example, some municipalities are already losing nearly 10% of their police forces due to officers who have been activated with the reserves of the armed forces.

Iraq has allowed international weapons inspectors to re-enter the country in order to identify and destroy weapons of mass destruction and development capabilities. Weapons inspectors have also begun to interview Iraqi scientists who have been key to the development of the privy to the country's military.

Taking the time to deliberate more intelligently in no way diminishes the valor of our troops. To the contrary, because we love and support our young men and women who are willing to give their lives to defend their nation, they deserve our fullest efforts to keep them out of harm's way.

When President Bush addressed the UN last Fall, he warned that it risks irrelevancy if it did not stand up and take decisive action with regard to Iraq. Now that it has, we risk rendering it irrelevant when we appear ready to act on our own conclusions—conclusions that have yet to be supported by substantive evidence.

If the Administration has credible evidence of illegal weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, it should immediately share this information with the weapons inspectors so it can be substantiated once and for all. And here at home, the Administration should own up and tell the truth to the American people regarding the level of threat we are actually facing.

IRAQ HAS NOT DISARMED

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.

Mr. HUNTER. Madam Speaker, 6,500 chemical bombs, which is roughly 1,000 tons of deadly chemical; 2,000 chemical rockets, 8,500 liters of biological agent or medium, and that is enough to produce some 5,000 liters of anthrax; these weapons are the weapons which Chief Weapons Inspector of the United Nations Hans Blix says the Iraqi Government has failed to produce for the inspecting teams. In other words, Iraq has not disarmed.

Now, we have heard in the last several months lots of statements from the administration, and we have heard statements from proponents of the

President's policy and from opponents of the President's policy. But these are the statements from the United Nations weapons inspector whose job was to go to Iraq, confront the Iraqi Government with their own statements, their own declarations and documents, some of which we had captured, others which they had produced during the 1990s, list the items line by line saying, here are weapons that you listed; where are they? And, in fact, Iraq has now failed to produce those weapons, meaning Iraq has failed to disarm.

This is an exercise in disarmament. That is where the country which is being inspected is supposed to make a declaration as to what weapons they have, just like South Africa did with its nuclear program, and then offer up the locations of those stockpiled weapons and that machinery that produces the weapons for destruction by this international body. In fact, Iraq has done what we predicted it would do, and that is that it has hidden these weapons, which it heretofore had proclaimed it had. We know they have them, we know they have them buried somewhere, and they are failing to produce them. That is, they are failing to disarm, and those are the words of the Chief Weapons Inspector.

Madam Speaker, let me just go to a couple of particulars once more. I am quoting Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix. He says, "The document indicates," and he received the document from the Iraqi Air Force as to how many bombs they had had at one time, chemical bombs, because we know they use chemical bombs on their own people and on their neighbors, and he said, "The document indicated that some 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1998, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of some 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tons. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for."

So, Madam Speaker, we know what they had, we know what they have. Incidentally, Chief Inspector Hans Blix goes through each one of these circumstances where they have failed to come forward and produce the weapons or show evidence that they were destroyed. And in these cases that I have cited, there is no evidence that they have destroyed any of this stuff. We know it is still there, and we know it is there in most cases not by evidence that we received through a third party, but by the statements of Iraq itself at a previous time.

In turning to biological weapons, Mr. Blix said, and I quote, "I mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions, and I come back to it as an important one. Iraq has declared that it produced 8,500 liters of this biological warfare agent which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the

summer of 1991." So Iraq claimed that they had gotten rid of this in secret, and he says, "I find no convincing evidence for its destruction."

He goes on. He says, "As I reported to the Council on the 19th of December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kilos, of bacterial growth media which was acknowledged as reported in Iraq's submission to the panel in February 1999. As a part of its 7 December, 2002, declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim Panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media," and this is the media from which you grow anthrax, extremely deadly anthrax, he said, "The table showing this report was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate, as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered." Meaning that Iraq pulled out this 650 kilos of anthrax media, simply tore that page out of the report, renumbered the report, and handed it to the weapons inspectors. That 650 kilos, incidentally, is enough growth media to produce about 5,000 liters of anthrax.

So we know now that Saddam Hussein has maintained and kept both biological weapons and chemical weapons, and he has failed to turn them over. He has failed to disarm.

Does he have a method to deliver these weapons? Yes, he does. They include the AS-2 and the AF-2 missiles, which are illegal missiles, because these missiles have been tested for ranges beyond 150 kilometers that Saddam Hussein is limited to.

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He has also refurbished his missile infrastructure, that means his capability to develop and build missiles to carry these chemical and biological weapons to their targets. He has also acquired, very recently, some 300 rocket engines.

So the point is, Mr. Speaker, that when the smoke all clears, at least with respect to the work that has been done so far, I think what has happened is pretty predictable, because we on the Committee on Armed Services in the House had in open session an Iraqi engineer who appeared before us who was part of Saddam Hussein's weapons development program. He said to us that even in the 1990s when we had inspectors on the ground and those inspectors were being shown the insides of big empty buildings, a few miles away Saddam Hussein's program was going at full steam and the inspectors did not know anything about it.

So take this country, which is twice the size of the State of Idaho, and take this small contingent, roughly the size of a police force in a small American city, and spread them out over a piece of land twice the size of Idaho. And having given the other guys literally years to hide their weapons, it is no surprise that no weapons are found. In fact, if some of our inspectors walked into the middle of one of these big

empty buildings and actually found a large quantity of biological weapons sitting there in the front of one of those big empty buildings that the maid had somehow forgotten to clean up the night before, the Iraqi bureaucrat who was in charge of that particular deception process, and they have a whole agency devoted to deception, would be two things: he would be considered to be the dumbest bureaucrat in Iraq and, shortly thereafter, the deadeast.

So the idea that somehow we are going to stumble upon a large number of weapons is not realistic. That is what we have been saying for a long time.

The message to us is very clear: Iraq has not disarmed. They have no intention of disarming. The documented proof of their weapons systems that they have maintained, when matched against what they have produced, shows that they still have enormous chemical and biological weapons on hand, along with the means to deliver them.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to yield to my friend, the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would just say to the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER), I thank him for taking this time to bring this very important issue before the House and, indirectly, before the American people.

We just returned from a break. I had plenty of time, ample time, back home to talk with my constituents, and in fact traveled around the country a bit to talk with others from other people's districts. The report that the gentleman makes reference to that is the Hans Blix report I think speaks volumes to the questions that I was asked as I made my way around my district and around other people's districts.

The basic question was: How do we know, or how does the administration know and how will the Congress help to determine what our policy should be toward Iraq when the inspectors cannot find any weapons, any weapons of mass destruction? This report speaks volumes to this.

However, before this report even came out, there were very strong indications here in the Congress in the hearings that the Committee on Armed Services held, both closed hearings and open hearings, where members of the administration, representatives of the Department of Defense, and representatives from our intelligence apparatus or institutions would come before us and would say, here is what we know.

Without going into the specifics of what we heard in those closed sessions, this report that the gentleman from California (Chairman HUNTER) has gone to great lengths to describe, which we have heard about through the media all day, verifies much of the information that we learned during those sessions earlier this year, actually in the fall.

Also, I think it is very interesting to point out that yesterday the Secretary of State in a speech in Switzerland said something that I think is extremely important on this same question of how do we know if we cannot find the weapons. The Secretary of State said simply this: we have known for a long time that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. After all, he used them in the war against Iran. After all, he used them against his own people, that is, chemical weapons, which the gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) referred to here just a short time ago.

Then the Secretary of State went on to say that the question is not and the job of the weapons inspectors is not to find the weapons; the job, as designated in Resolution 1441, is to seek the cooperation of the Iraqi Government in proving that they have destroyed their weapons. That is where the Iraqi Government has been lacking. The Iraqi Government has steadfastly denied having any weapons, but has failed to offer an iota of proof.

For example, if chemical weapons have been destroyed, why can we not talk to the people who destroyed them? If there are no biological weapons, if those biological substances have been destroyed, where were they destroyed? Show us. Let us talk to the people that destroyed them.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I would tell the gentleman, we have documents that were produced by Iraq during the 1990s where they gave us the names of some 3,500 key people in the development of their chemical and biological weapons. Do Members know what has happened to those people? They have disappeared.

We asked them during this round, according to Hans Blix, to produce those people. They only produced 400 of them. Of course, they do not let any of them talk without an Iraqi keeper or bureaucrat standing next to them. Also, they do not even produce the other 3,000 people. Those 3,000 people in Iraq who are associated with their chemical and biological weapons program have apparently disappeared from the face of the Earth. They tell us we may get another 80 to talk to at some point, but the 3,000 have disappeared.

Mr. SAXTON. This seems to me to be just what Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, was talking about when he said that the question really is when, on the one hand, the Iraqi Government says there are no biological or chemical or nuclear weapons, why then on the other hand will they not show us evidence to prove that? And the answer seems to me, in light of the Blix report, quite simple: these weapons really exist, and therefore they cannot prove that they do not.

So I think that the answer to the question that my constituents and people that I talked to in other parts of the country over the break, the answer to the question is quite evident. The

answer is that these weapons do exist, just as we have maintained for years, and in particular in the last month.

So both Secretary Powell and Hans Blix in different words came to the same conclusion. Hans Blix says on this subject, "In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these weapons exist." We have assumed, based on evidence that was gathered by the Committee on Armed Services during the fall of this year, that they continue to exist.

Another question which I think is important, and I think this report bears on this question as well, my constituents and people around the country ask me: What do the French, the Germans, the Russians, and the Chinese know that we do not? They are part of the United Nations Security Council, as well. I say that the evidence that is pointed out in the Blix report should be taken very seriously and taken to heart by the French and the Germans and the Russians and Chinese, because they have as much at stake in this as we do.

This report, which speaks volumes, is an extremely important document. I think one of the statements in the report by Hans Blix, who has had an opportunity, obviously, to review the 12,000 pages which the Iraqi Government forwarded in terms of its supposed accuracy as an accurate report on the condition of their weapons of mass destruction program, Hans Blix says, we have seen this all before. It is essentially 12,000 pages copied from the transmissions that were given to previous teams of arms inspectors, so the Iraqis have offered us nothing new here. In fact, they have shown us once again that they are, as Hans Blix said publicly today, not prepared to endorse the concept of disarmament.

The Bush administration, the President himself, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Vice President CHENEY, Secretary of State Powell, have all maintained in different ways for months that we have to do something to engage this problem. The Blix report from an independent United Nations-appointed inspection team has now verified the contentious situation that actually exists within the Iraqi Government today.

I am pleased and again I want to thank the gentleman from California for taking this time so that he and I together can share this information with our colleagues, and indirectly with the American people.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank my distinguished colleague, and I thank him for all the work that he has done and for the work that he is going to do as chairman of this new subcommittee on the Committee on Armed Services, which is going to oversee a great deal of this activity.

Let me just end by saying that we predicted that the tours that the U.N. weapons inspectors were given would not result in them walking into a big cavernous building and having a supply

of chemical or biological weapons sitting there on the floor of that particular facility waiting for them to scoop it up.

We predicted that the Iraqi Government, which has devoted entire agencies to hiding this stuff as effectively as they could, will have done just that, that is, to hide it in such a way that we would be more likely to be able to ask all of the drug dealers in Washington, D.C. to amass all of their illicit cocaine and marijuana and pile it in one big area where the authorities could come down and seize it on a given day.

The burden was on Iraq to disarm. That is the key. It is not a game where we have certain rules and if they are able to beat us, if they are able to hide this stuff well enough, we do not find it. We know they have it because the 6,500 chemical bombs, the 2,000 chemical rockets, the precursors for 5,000 liters of anthrax, are weapons which exist according to Iraqi documentation, not our documentation but their documentation that they had produced earlier; also, those 3,000 people who are associated with the programs, those 3,000 technical people who now have disappeared off the face of the Earth.

So they have it. They have it just as surely as Nazi Germany had a weapons program of massive proportions in the mid-1930s, even though they were giving reports to the Allies that the air force that we appeared to see in the skies was actually flying clubs that were organized for recreation; but we knew that they were in fact producing weapons. In this case, we know for a fact that Iraq is still heavily weaponized, with the ability to kill lots of its neighbors and lots of Americans and their allies.

So this report is, I think, more dramatic in what it says they have not produced than what it says they have produced. I think it is becoming clearer and clearer that the inspections are not going to produce a situation in which the inspectors walk into a giant facility and, lo and behold, there are piles of weapons sitting there on the floor produced by the most ineffective Iraqi bureaucrat in history. They will not disarm.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I just would like to add that earlier today in a news report I saw or heard that the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, suggested that the inspectors need more time. Also, the Secretary of State today indicated that if there was going to be more time, it would not be much; but there is going to be more activity on the part of the inspectors.

I would say this: I suspect that the people who are listening to this are not in a position to answer these questions. But if Saddam Hussein or his foreign minister or somebody was listening, I would say to them that we know that they had thousands of artillery shells that were capable of carrying chemical substances that would kill people to

their targets. They say they have destroyed them.

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If you have destroyed them, show us where they were destroyed, show us where the remnants of them are, and let us talk to the people who did it. Let us talk to the people who destroyed them. If you do not have chemical weapons, show us how you destroyed them. Show us the people, let us talk to the people that destroyed your chemical weapons. That is how we verify. If you do not have biological weapons, show us the disposition of what you had and let us talk to the scientists, let us talk to the personnel that destroyed it, because we know you had it, and we believe you still have it today. And if you are serious about making statements that you do not have it, that these weapons do not exist, then show us how they were destroyed.

And with regard to their nuclear weapons program, we know that the Iraqis imported aluminum tubular material that is designed and built specifically for the production of nuclear material. If those no longer exist, show us how you destroyed them and let us talk to the scientists and let us talk to the personnel who destroyed them. We have not seen any of these things, and we have not talked to any of these people, or the inspectors have not, I should say.

I heard today another statement that this process is not about finding weapons, it is about developing trust. It is about developing trust between the Iraqi Government and the rest of the governments of the world. This is how we develop trust, by verifying your statements so that we can trust. And so I hope that this process will move forward.

The gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) and I are sometimes asked by people why we favor going to war. We do not favor going to war. We favor dismantling the weapons of mass destruction that the Iraqis have, and we have supported the process of inspections. We have supported the process of investigation. We have supported the process of questioning. We have supported the process of asking questions as to where these materials are, whether they have been destroyed. And it is only as a last resort that we would ever advocate using military force. The gentleman from California (Mr. HUNTER) has a son in the Marine Corps. The last thing in the world the gentleman wants to do is to see our country in another military conflict.

Just last Friday I went to Paris Island where I proudly watched my nephew Curt graduate from basic training in the Marine Corps. The last thing I want to see is Curtis in Iraq or anyplace else fighting a war that can be averted by cooperation between people and cooperation between countries and the development of trust.

So once again I give the floor to the gentleman from California (Mr.

HUNTER). I hope that the Iraqis will in the next very short period of time cooperate with the United Nations and the leadership of various countries around the world.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I think it is clear one last time to point out that there are 6,500 chemical bombs that Iraq will not give up, it has not disarmed; a couple of thousand chemical rockets; and 8,500 liters of what is known as biological media for the production of anthrax that is capable of producing about 5,000 liters of anthrax. So they have not disarmed. And facts are stubborn things. Those are the facts.

Mr. Speaker, I would recognize the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. COLLINS), who has a major infantry base in his district, the great Fort Benning, where I have spent lot of time low crawling.

Mr. COLLINS. It is home for the infantry, chief of the infantry.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened with strong interest here with the comments of the gentlemen about the numbers that came through the report today, and the gentleman here with his comments, too, and I am glad both of you all are on the Committee on Armed Services. They have put forth very good points here and made very good points of what is going on.

This was a major conversation piece in my district. As I have pointed out, the President of the United States does not want to go to war. The purpose of all the deployment to the Middle East is to deal with this issue from strength, to send the message large, loud and clear to Saddam Hussein that the decision for war is his. The President has said that he will make the decision, Saddam will make the decision. The lack of coming forward with the information that they have previously given in verifying, as so well put by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SAXTON), is evidence he is making a decision.

His clock is ticking. Time is running out. He has to make a decision as to own up to the disarmament, how it has been done, who did it and verify, or we, as the United States, have no choice but to follow his decision, Saddam Hussein's decision.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I thank the two gentlemen for their comments and their remarks in support of the United States and our freedom.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his very eloquent point. Saddam Hussein has not disarmed. We know what he has. He has not brought it forward, and we will continue to march down the next several weeks to see if he brings those weapons out for destruction.

SENIORS NEED MEDICARE NOT MAYBE CARE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. BOOZMAN). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 7, 2003, the gentleman from Maine (Mr. ALLEN) is